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WESTERN HEMISPHERE FREE TRADE INITIATIVES
WILLIAM H. CAVITrTt
I. INTRODUCTION
A quiet revolution is underway in the Western Hemisphere.
While the world's attention has focused on the dramatic events
in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and the Persian
Gulf, many countries of the Western Hemisphere have moved
toward democratically elected governments and free market
economies. The United States foreign economic policies to-
ward the Western Hemisphere are designed to facilitate these
trends and, thus, will affect how we and our neighbors live to-
gether in the next century.
This article describes the various components of U.S. trade
and commercial policy toward the countries of the Western
Hemisphere, including a progress report on implementation
of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CFTA).' There
follows a discussion of the prospects for a North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)2 with Mexico and Canada,
and finally, descriptions of the President's Enterprise for the
Americas,' Caribbean Basin,4 and Andean Trade Initiatives.5
This article also discusses the implications of these regional
trade initiatives for the future of the multilateral trading sys-
tem, specifically the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
t Director, Office of Canada, United States Department of Commerce, Wash-
ington, D.C. B.A. 1966, University of Nebraska.
Parties interested in further information on United States-Canadian trade can call
the Office of Canada at (202) 377-3101.
1. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988,
Jan. 2, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (codified in scattered sections of 19
U.S.C.) [hereinafter CFTA Implementation Act].
2. See NAFTA Pact Can Be Reached by November, But Passage Is Up to Congress, 9 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 666 (Apr. 15, 1992).
3. Exec. Order No. 12,757, 56 Fed. Reg. 12,107 (1991), reprinted in 7 U.S.C.A.
§ 1738 ann. (West Supp. 1992).
4. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 3201-06 (West
Supp. 1992).
5. Andean Trade Preference Act, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 3201-3206 (West Supp. 1992).
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(GATT).6
II. UNITED STATES-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
On January 1, 1989, the United States and Canada began
implementing the CFTA. The CFTA represents a watershed
in trade relations between the United States and Canada and
has provided the impetus for further regional trade
agreements.
Because of the CFTA, both countries will enjoy greater eco-
nomic growth, increased trade and investment, greater energy
security, more jobs, lower prices, and greater competitiveness
at home and abroad. Although the CFTA does not solve all of
our bilateral commercial problems, it makes most trade
problems more amenable to solution.
Before highlighting the salient points of the CFTA, it is im-
portant to know the size of the U.S.-Canada trade relationship.
Canada is our largest trading partner.' In 1990, total bilateral
trade in goods and services was $216 billion, up from $161
billion in 1987, a $55 billion increase in just three years.8 In
1990, the United States also exported $84 billion of merchan-
dise to 26 million Canadians, an average of $3,231 of U.S. ex-
ports per person, 9 compared to $392 worth of U.S. exports to
Japan,' 0 $350 to Mexico," $284 to the European Commu-
nity, 12 and $14 to Eastern Europe.'
3
6. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature, Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
7. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, SURVEY OF CURRENT
BUSINESS, Dec. 1991, at 65.
8. Id. at 25.
9. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, SURVEY OF CURRENT
BUSINESS, Mar. 1992, at 64; see also THE WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS 1992, at
745.
10. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, SURVEY OF CURRENT
BUSINESS, Mar. 1992, at 64; see also WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS 773 (1992).
11. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, SURVEY OF CURRENT
BUSINESS, Mar. 1992, at 64; see also THE WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS 783
(1992).
12. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, SURVEY OF CURRENT
BUSINESS, Mar. 1992, at 64; see also THE WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS 783
(1992).
13. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, SURVEY OF CURRENT
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A. Highlights of the Agreement
While the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement is the most
comprehensive free trade arrangement ever negotiated, its
comprehensiveness belies its simplicity. The CFTA basically is
designed to do three things: to provide greater market access,
to provide more secure market access, and to allow market
forces to work. These three themes run throughout the
Agreement.
The CFTA achieves greater market access because it, in ef-
fect, expands the size of the United States' "domestic" market
by ten percent. With the addition of 26 million Canadians, our
market has grown from 250 million people to 276 million.
Conversely, Canada enjoys a 1000 percent increase in the size
of its "domestic" market by including the U.S. market.
The CFTA ensures more secure market access through sta-
ble government policies and orderly dispute settlement. Prior
to the CFTA, disputes were handled in an ad hoc manner, usu-
ally only after the two sides had become entrenched in their
respective positions from which compromise was difficult. A
strong and expeditious dispute settlement mechanism assures
that the resolution of disputes will be undertaken in a timely
and orderly manner. 4 This is important in a commercial rela-
tionship as large and complex as that of the United States and
Canada.
There have been some disputes about CFTA implementa-
tion. Given the magnitude of the agreement and of our bilat-
eral trading relationship, this is neither surprising nor a cause
for alarm. These disputes collectively account for only about
three percent of our overall trade and investment relationship,
but typically they have received most of the attention. It is un-
fortunate that these disputes are considered "newsworthy"
while the overall success of the CFTA is not reported.
Moreover, many of the disputes now associated with the
CFTA actually pre-date the agreement, fall outside of it, and
are related to our respective international obligations under
GATT. Hence, such disputes would exist in the absence of the
CFTA. Whatever the origin of the disputes, the CFTA pro-
vides an orderly process to resolve them and is being used as
intended.
14. CFTA Implementation Act, supra note 1, §§ 410, 102 Stat. at 1878-98.
1992]
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The CFTA allows market forces to work by eliminating trade
barriers and by putting policies in place which leave decisions
to the marketplace rather than interposing government poli-
cies and regulations. What follows is an explanation of the
CFTA provisions of interest to most business people.
1. Elimination of Tariffs
The CFTA eliminates all tariffs, without exception, over a
ten year period, thereby creating many new exporting oppor-
tunities. Furniture, apparel and carpeting are three product
areas where U.S. exports have already increased because of re-
duced tariffs.
The CFTA also provides periodic opportunities to request
accelerated tariff elimination.' 5 The 1989 cycle was completed
on April 1, 1990, when accelerated tariff elimination was ef-
fected on over 400 tariff line items, comprising $6 billion in
bilateral trade. 6 The 1990 cycle was completed on July 1,
1991, when the U.S. and Canadian governments accelerated
tariff elimination on another 250 tariff line items, plus 400 in-
dividual products, comprising approximately $2 billion in bi-
lateral trade. 7
A third and final round of accelerated tariff elimination ne-
gotiations was announced in the Federal Register of November
15, 1991.18 Those negotiations will occur during 1992. Any
further tariff reductions likely will be effective about April 1,
1993.
The accelerated tariff eliminations made to date, plus those
in the offing, represent an important vote of confidence by the
business communities on both sides of the border. Indeed, the
efficacy of the CFTA is demonstrated by these tariff reductions,
which were made in response to hundreds of requests by busi-
ness on both sides of the border.
2. Specific Agreements to Open Markets
Aside from phased elimination of all tariffs, the CFTA also
contains several specific agreements which are designed to
15. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, art. 401(5), 27
I.L.M. 281, 306 [hereinafter CFTA].
16. Proclamation No. 6142, 55 Fed. Reg. 21,835 (1990).
17. Proclamation No. 6343, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,003 (1991).
18. 56 Fed. Reg. 58,117 (1991).
[Vol. 18
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open U.S. and Canadian markets and give equal access to both
U.S. and Canadian businesses.
a. Investment Agreement
The investment agreement has created a stable and predict-
able business environment which fostered a $25 billion in-
crease in direct investment in each others' economies. In
1987, the year before the agreement was signed, investment
was $79 billion; in 1990, it was $104 billion. U.S. investment
in Canada rose $14 billion during those three years, while Ca-
nadian investment in the United States rose $11 billion. 9
It also is noteworthy that in 1990 foreign direct investment
in Canada exceeded Canadian investment abroad for the first
time since 1973. These investment flows indicate that the
structural adjustments necessary to take advantage of the new
trade and investment opportunities created by the CFTA are in
fact occurring, although at a slower pace than would have oc-
curred were it not for the recession.
b. Services Agreement
The services agreement covers over 150 service sectors and
is the world's first comprehensive agreement governing trade
in services. The agreement embodies the following principles:
(1) national treatment, or nondiscrimination; (2) the right of
establishment, or the right to invest in the partner country if
one chooses; (3) transparency, or the right to know the rules of
the road and have the opportunity to comply with them; and
(4) the right to sell across borders, or the right not to invest
abroad if one chooses to provide the service from one's home
country.20 In 1990 bilateral trade in services was $37 billion,
up from $31 billion in 1987.21
The services agreement also contains a standstill agreement
which prohibits the parties from further restricting current
trade. That is, the services provisions of the CFTA require
that future regulations be no more restrictive than current
19. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Dep't of Commerce, SURVEY OF CURRENT Busi-
NESS, June 1991, at 24.
20. CFTA, supra note 15, chs. 14, 17, 27 I.L.M. at 360-68, 381-83.
2 1. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, SURVEY OF CURRENT
BUSINESS, June 1988, at 81-83; Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Com-
merce, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, June 1991, at 29, 32.
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practices.22 Moreover, once more liberal rules are put into
place, those too are subject to the standstill agreement.
The CFTA services chapter also includes special provisions
for certain industries: architecture, tourism, and telecommuni-
cations and network-based enhanced computer services.2"
Pursuant to the architecture annex to the services chapter, the
U.S. and Canadian architectural professional organizations
have developed mutually acceptable standards which allow ar-
chitects to practice in both countries. The next step is for the
two governments to review and ratify those standards and to
incorporate them into the CFTA, probably as a revision of the
current annex. Similar initiatives are underway among profes-
sional associations representing accountants, engineers, and
land surveyors.
c. Standards Agreement
The standards agreement provides that standards-related
measures and procedures shall not be used to hinder trade un-
necessarily and that the two countries will work together to
harmonize such measures and procedures where appropri-
ate. 24 Given that most standards setting in both countries is
done in the private sector for the private sector, governments
have only a limited role in this area. Accordingly, the CFTA
commits the governments to work toward harmonization with
their respective private sector standards setting, testing, and
certification bodies.
Some progress already has been made. For example, six Ca-
nadian and six U.S. heating and air conditioning standards
have been combined into one binational standard. The big
winners are the manufacturers in both countries who can now
produce more efficiently according to one standard. Consum-
ers also have a wider selection at lower cost.
d. Government Procurement Agreement
The government procurement agreement provides new,
nondiscriminatory access to $500 million worth of Canadian
federal procurements and to $3 billion of U.S. federal procure-
22. CFTA, supra note 15, art. 1402(1), 27 I.L.M. at 361.
23. Id. annex 1404(a)-(c), 27 I.L.M. at 364-68.
24. Id. arts. 603, 604.
[Vol. 18
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ments annually. 25 These new opportunities have been espe-
cially beneficial to small- and medium-sized businesses. In the
first three years after implementation of the CFTA, 442 Cana-
dian government contracts totalling $26 million were awarded
to U.S. firms. Without the CFTA, those tenders would not
have been open to U.S. bidders.
e. Energy Agreement
The energy agreement 26 promotes further deregulation,
removes almost all barriers, and assures buyers and sellers that
they can make decisions on future energy supply relationships
based on market considerations. Bilateral trade in energy and
energy products exceeds $10 billion a year.
3. Elimination of Non-tariff Barriers
The CFTA also eliminates or reduces many other non-tariff
barriers, thus creating new marketing opportunities. The elim-
ination of the Canadian embargo on imports of used aircraft
and the phase-out of the embargo on used motor vehicles are
two examples. Several other provisions of the CFTA also will
help reduce non-tariff barriers.
a. Easier Movement Across Borders
Improved border crossing procedures and visa requirements
for temporary business travel and tourism facilitate travel back
and forth across the border. This is important because im-
proved trading opportunities are useless if business people do
not have access to their markets and customers. A bilateral
Border Crossing Work Group meets regularly to ensure that
these commitments are smoothly implemented.
Improved customs procedures and new rules-of-origin also
assure that the benefits of the CFTA accrue only to the United
States and Canada because they are the only countries which
have undertaken its obligations. Two binational customs work
groups-one addressing the rules-of-origin issues and the
other addressing market access issues-are working to facili-
tate the movement of goods across the border and to ensure
25. Id. art. 1301(l), 27 I.L.M. at 353.
26. See id. ch. 9, 27 I.L.M. at 343-46.
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that the new rules fulfill the designers' intentions that they be
transparent, predictable, simple to use, and easy to administer.
b. Antidumping and Countervailing Duties
The CFTA establishes binational panel reviews of final an-
tidumping and countervailing duty determinations to assure
that the results of unfair trade investigations comply with do-
mestic law and that all rulings are fair and impartial.27
The Binational Secretariat, which administers the panel re-
view process, continues to function smoothly after three years.
The efficacy of the panel review process has been widely
praised by both interested parties and panelists on both sides
of the border.
These are but a few of the provisions of the U.S.-Canada
Free Trade Agreement. Depending on which business you are
in, there are other provisions which may be just as or more
important than those just mentioned. Other CFTA provisions
include agriculture, fisheries, cultural industries, financial serv-
ices, intellectual property, quantitative restrictions, telecom-
munications, safeguards, and wine & distilled spirits.
B. Limitations of the Free Trade Agreement
It is important to emphasize that the CFTA means that we
are business partners and nothing more. The CFTA does not
alter any other aspects of our relationship. The United States
and Canada remain separate, culturally distinct, sovereign
countries. The CFTA takes account of sensitivities on both
sides of the border. For example, Canada's concerns about its
sovereignty, cultural heritage, social programs, and separate
identity have been respected in the CFTA.
In summary, the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement is a
historic achievement that will create new trade and investment
opportunities for businesses in both countries. However, the
CFTA will be an engine for further economic growth, new jobs
and lower prices only if the business community becomes
aware of the changing commercial environment and adopts ap-
propriate business strategies and marketing plans to take ad-
vantage of those opportunities.
Over the long term, doing business across the border will be
27. See id. ch. 19, 27 I.L.M. at 386-95.
[Vol. 18
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easier and more efficient because of the CFTA. But in the
short term, many laws, rules and regulations with which the
business community is familiar have changed or will soon
change. It is therefore important that exporters and importers
educate themselves about those changes and the opportunities
they create. We in the U.S. Department of Commerce stand
ready to help businesses learn about and take advantage of
those new opportunities.
III. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
NEGOTIATIONS
On February 5, 1991, the Presidents of the United States
and of Mexico and the Prime Minister of Canada announced
their intention to begin negotiations on a North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Successful negotiation of such an
agreement would create a free trade area comprising over 360
million people with a combined annual output in excess of $6
trillion.
Six years ago when Canada and the United States began ne-
gotiating their free trade agreement, the idea of a U.S.-Mexico
Free Trade Agreement was inconceivable. Today, it makes ex-
cellent sense for both countries for three reasons. First, a free
trade agreement would contribute to long term economic
prosperity, stability, and growth in Mexico. An economically
prosperous Mexico is important because the lack of economic
opportunity is at the root of bilateral problems such as illegal
immigration, drugs and pollution.
Second, NAFTA would advance the cause of economic re-
form in Latin America. The eyes of the region are on Mexico,
a leader among Latin American nations. Its success could
serve as a model for market-oriented policies and reforms else-
where in the hemisphere. In this vein, NAFTA would further
the cause of the President's Enterprise for the Americas Initia-
tive, which has as its goal the negotiation of a free trade zone
from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. Successful negotiation of a
free trade agreement with Mexico would be a milestone on the
road toward a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Area.
Finally, NAFTA makes good business sense. Mexico is our
third largest trading partner, with two-way merchandise trade
of $64 billion in 1991. Mexico also is our fastest growing ex-
port market. U.S. exports to Mexico have grown at an average
1992]
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annual rate of 22% since 1987, while exports to Japan have
grown only 15%, to the European Community only 14%, to
Canada only 9%, and to the rest of the world only 9%.28
Exports are essential to U.S. economic growth. Since 1986,
exports have grown at a faster rate than the economy as a
whole.29 It is estimated that every one billion dollars of U.S.
exports supports more than 20,000 U.S. jobs. 0 U.S. exports
to Mexico more than doubled from $14 billion in 1987 to
$32.5 billion in 1991. Thus, U.S. jobs that depend on exports
to Mexico have increased from about 280,000 in 1987 to
660,000 in 1991.
Simply put, freer trade means more trade, and more trade
means more jobs. U.S. business sees major trade and invest-
ment opportunities in Mexico and wants assured market ac-
cess. The importance of exports to American jobs and
prosperity is a prime factor in President Bush's decision to
pursue a free trade agreement with Mexico and Canada.
A. Impetus for Negotiations
Most of these principles were as true six years ago as they
are today. So what has changed to bring us to this day? The
short answer is: Mexico itself. In 1986, Mexico joined the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT)"' and began a
process of reform which continues today. President Salinas,
building on the foundation laid by President de la Madrid, has
implemented dramatic economic reforms.
Tariffs have been reduced to a maximum of 20% ad valorem,
well below the 50% maximum of Mexico's GATT accession
agreement. Many tariffs formerly were as high as 100%. To-
day, on a trade-weighted basis, Mexico's average tariff on im-
ports from the United States is about 10%, which is the same
as Canada's average tariff before the CFTA cuts were
28. See CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 1991, at 325 [hereinafter WORLD FACTBOOK
1991]; CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 1988, at 246 [hereinafter WORLD FACTBOOK
1988].
29. See WORLD FACTBOOK 1991, supra note 28, at 325; WORLD FACTBOOK 1988,
supra note 28, at 246.
30. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Dep't of Commerce, SURVEY OF CURRENT Busi-
NESS, Mar. 1992, at 76.
31. Protocol for the Accession of Mexico to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, reprinted in GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARRIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRU-
MENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 3 (33d Supp. 1987).
[Vol. 18
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Import licenses, which were universal as recently as 1983,
are required for only 230 tariff lines, which is only 7% of the
value of U.S. exports to Mexico. 33 Investment regulations
were revamped in May 1989 to create a business climate more
conducive to foreign direct investment.34 Intellectual property
rights laws were enacted to improve Mexico's protection of
patents, trademarks and copyrights.
Privatizations of government-owned enterprises have been
implemented on a large scale. Of the 1,155 state-owned enter-
prises in 1982, 801 have been authorized for divestment, and
over 600 actually have been privatized.36 Banking, airlines,
copper mining, telecommunications, insurance and steel are
some of the sectors and industries being reprivatized.
External debt restructuring has been pursued aggressively.
Following debt renegotiation under the Salinas Administra-
tion, Mexico's debt servicing burden has declined, leading to
heightened business confidence and increased capital inflows.
These reforms, when coupled with a free trade agreement,
provide a powerful impetus for further economic growth, in-
creased trade and investment, more jobs, lower prices, and
greater competitiveness at home and abroad.
B. Goals of NAFTA Negotiations
The United States' goals in the NAFTA negotiations are sim-
ilar to those we had in the CFTA with Canada: to provide
greater market access, to make that access more secure, and to
allow market forces to work. Our negotiators have carefully
examined the provisions of the U.S.-Canada FTA and the is-
sues in the ongoing Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations to
determine which issues are applicable to North American trade
and investment.
U.S. negotiators of NAFTA continue to consult extensively
32. See Lawrence Kootnikoff, Coming Together, Bus. MEXICO, Mar. 1991.
33. See generally Foreign Trade Barriers Described in U.S. T.R. Report, LDR DEBT REP./
LATIN AM. MARKETS, Apr. 8, 1991, at 8.
34. Reglamento de la Ley para Promover la Inversidn Mexicana y Regular la Inverslbn
Extranjera, D.O., May 16, 1989, translated in GONZALEZ VARGAS BRYAN & GONZALEZ
BAZ BRYAN, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN MEXICO: A SUMMARY OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS
CURRENTLY IN FORCE (1991).
35. Ley para Desarrollo y Proteccidn de Propiedad Intelectual, D.O., June 27, 1991.
36. See Kootnikoff, supra note 32.
19921
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with Congress and the U.S. private sector-business, industry,
labor and agriculture-to seek their views on what our specific
negotiating goals should be. Based on their advice, U.S. nego-
tiating objectives include: (1) the phased elimination of all tar-
iffs; (2) rules-of-origin which are simple to use and easy to
administer; (3) the elimination of duty remission, duty draw-
back, and duty avoidance programs within the free trade area;
(4) improved customs procedures and border infrastructure to
facilitate the flow of goods among the partner countries; (5)
the elimination of nontariff barriers and performance require-
ments, such as import licenses and local content and export
requirements; (6) an investment agreement that will create a
stable and predictable business environment; (7) comprehen-
sive intellectual property rights protection, including well de-
veloped standards of protection for patents, trademarks,
copyrights, and computer software; (8) a globally competitive
North American automotive industry which is free of govern-
ment-imposed trade and investment restrictions; (9) increased
access to each others' government procurement markets; (10)
a services agreement which embodies the principles of national
treatment, the right of establishment, transparency, and the
right to sell across borders; (11) improved border crossing
procedures to facilitate the movement of temporary business
travelers, shoppers, and tourists; (12) harmonization of stan-
dards-related measures and procedures to preclude their use
as trade barriers, to increase trading opportunities, and to pro-
mote greater manufacturing efficiency; (13) an effective dis-
pute settlement mechanism that will increase certainty and
predictability for exporters; and (14) safeguards to assure that
the transition to free trade is gradual, with no abrupt changes
in existing patterns of employment, investment, production or
trade.
These are some of the goals which business, industry, labor,
and agriculture already have indicated they would like to see
the three governments pursue. You will note that their sug-
gestions closely track the provisions of the U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement.
C. Negotiating Process and Timetable
The United States is negotiating under the so-called "fast
[Vol. 18
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track" procedures provided by Congress.37 The fast track is
important because it means that the Congress must approve or
disapprove any resulting agreement by a single up or down
vote within a defined time frame. Amendments are not
permitted.3 8
Without fast track, the President could not assure our nego-
tiating partners that the deal they strike will be the one voted
on by Congress. Indeed, both Mexico and Canada condi-
tioned their participation in NAFTA on these assurances.
Congress gave its blessing to the NAFTA negotiations in
May 1991 when it extended its delegation of authority to the
President to negotiate under the fast track provisions.
39
NAFTA negotiations formally began on June 12, 1991 when
the trade ministers of the three countries met in Toronto, On-
tario, and agreed upon the modalities of the negotiations.
While there is no set time for the conclusion of negotiations,
the President has expressed the hope that the negotiators can
bring home an agreement in 1992. That agreement, however,
must be one which will serve U.S. economic interests and have
the support of the Congress and the American people.
The President's fast track authority will expire on June 1,
1993,40 so an agreement must be signed by then. However,
the fast track authority also requires that the President give the
Congress a minimum of ninety days notice of his intention to
enter into an agreement.4 As a practical matter, therefore, the
latest date for concluding substantive negotiations is March 1,
1993.
VI. ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS INITIATIVE
On June 27, 1990, President Bush announced his Enterprise
for the Americas Initiative (EAI) 42 to "encourage growth in the
Americas" through initiatives in the areas of trade, investment
and debt.43 The Enterprise is the most important foreign eco-
37. 19 U.S.C. § 2903 (1988).
38. Id.
39. President's Letter to Congressional Leaders on Fast Track Authority Exten-
sion and North American Free Trade Agreement, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 536
(May 3, 1991).
40. 19 U.S.C. § 2903 (1988).
41. Id.
42. Exec. Order No. 12,757, 56 Fed. Reg. 12,107 (1991).
43. President's Remarks Announcing the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative,
1992]
13
Cavitt: Western Hemisphere Free Trade Initiatives
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
nomic policy initiative toward Latin America since President
John F. Kennedy's "Alliance for Progress" and President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor Policy."
Unlike those earlier programs, the EAI emphasizes self-help.
True economic strength for Latin America will come from
trade, not aid, and private investment, not public investment.
The EAI is designed to support Latin countries in their efforts
to reform their economies and liberalize their international
trade and investment policies.
A. The Trade Initiative
The Trade Initiative is the first of three components of the
EA. 44 Its intermediate goal is the negotiation of comprehen-
sive free trade agreements (FTAs) with the countries of Latin
America. Successful negotiation of a North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada would be
an important milestone on the road toward the President's ul-
timate goal of hemispheric-wide free trade.
Since most countries are not yet ready to negotiate free
trade agreements, President Bush has proposed that interested
countries enter into bilateral "framework agreements" with
the United States. Such agreements would take note of the
benefits of open markets and would provide for the step-by-
step elimination of specific barriers. By resolving bilateral
trade irritants, framework agreements would lay the ground-
work for eventual comprehensive free trade agreements. The
President's vision has captured the imaginations of the hemi-
sphere's business and government leaders. Since the EAI was
announced, virtually all Latin and Caribbean countries have
signed framework agreements with the United States.
B. The Investment Initiative
The Investment Initiative is the second component of the
EAT. 45 Its goal is to realize the economic potential of the re-
gion by attracting and retaining long term capital investment.
26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1009 (July 2, 1990); see also Andrew Rosenthal, President
Announces Plan for More Latin Debt Relief, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1990, at DI.
44. The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative became law on November 28,
1990. Pub. L. No. 101-624, §§ 601-614, 104 Stat. 3359, 3658-62 (1990).
45. Exec. Order No. 12,757, 56 Fed. Reg. 12,107 (1991).
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A series of "bilateral investment treaties" would be further
milestones on the road toward hemispheric-wide free trade.
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) is playing a
positive role toward this end. The IDB has created a new lend-
ing program for countries that liberalize their investment re-
gimes. In a related move, the United States has proposed that
the IDB create an investment fund of $1.5 billion to assist
countries in carrying out privatization programs over the next
five years.
C. The Debt Initiative
The Debt Initiative is the third and final EAI component.46
It provides support for debt reduction in Latin America. This
will free some of the region's resources for further economic
development. Increased capital investment is important be-
cause U.S.-Latin American economic relations are substantial
and growing. Two-way trade totalled $118 billion in 1990."7
U.S. direct investment in the region is over $55 billion,4 and
U.S. creditors are owed approximately $56 billion.
The EAI is particularly timely because it reinforces the
strong movement toward economic reform and free market
policies now prevalent throughout Latin America. Such
changes are creating substantial new trade and investment op-
portunities for U.S. business. It is important to emphasize that
the Enterprise for the Americas is a long-term proposal.
There are no quick fixes. The ultimate success of the EAI rests
on a joint commitment by all of the countries of the Western
Hemisphere to reach the long-term goal of hemisphere-wide
free trade. The United States does not seek to create an in-
ward-looking trading bloc, but rather an expanding network of
trade-creating agreements, each of which can be viewed as a
milestone on the road toward the shared goal of global free
trade.
V. CARRIBEAN TRADE INITIATIVE
On August 5, 1983, President Reagan signed the Caribbean
46. Id.
47. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, SURVEY OF CURRENT
BUSINESS, Mar. 1992, at 76-77.
48. Id. at 29.
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Basin Economic Recovery Act 49 into law. The so-called Carib-
bean Basin Initiative (CBI) is a program of trade and invest-
ment that ushered in a new era in U.S. economic relations with
23 designated countries in the Caribbean, Central America,
and northern South America.
The overall objectives of the CBI are to encourage economic
development and thereby foster political and social stability in
the region. Major goals are: (1) to increase trade, (2) to in-
crease private sector investment in non-traditional sectors,
thereby diversifying the economic bases of the beneficiary
countries, and (3) to encourage host country governments to
adopt the reforms necessary to create business environments
essential to attract and hold long term capital investment.
The CBI has several features. Most importantly, it guaran-
tees duty-free entry into the United States for all products ex-
cept most textiles and apparel, canned tuna, petroleum, most
footwear, and certain watches and watch parts from designated
communist countries.50 Imports of leather flat goods receive
preferential treatment, but are not duty-free. 5
To qualify for duty-free entry, eligible products must be sub-
stantially transformed in the CBI countries and must have a
minimum of 35% of their value added in CBI countries.52
However, up to 15% of the added value may consist of U.S.
components.53 Products other than textiles and apparel that
are assembled in a beneficiary country from 100% U.S. com-
ponents will receive duty-free entry without regard to substan-
tial transformation and value-added criteria.5 4  A special
Guaranteed Access Level program allows CBI countries to ne-
gotiate increased access to the U.S. market for textile and ap-
parel articles that are assembled from fabric formed and cut in
the United States.
Investors in CBI countries which have signed Tax Informa-
tion Exchange Agreements with the United States may qualify
for below-market rate financing for eligible projects under a
1986 amendment to section 936 of the Internal Revenue
49. 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2706 (West Supp. 1992).
50. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2703(b) (West Supp. 1992).
51. Id. § 2703(h).
52. Id. § 2703(a)(1)(B).








In the first few years following implementation of the CBI,
total Caribbean Basin country exports to the United States de-
clined from $8.9 billion in 1983 to $6.1 billion in 1986. This
was due to the crash in petroleum prices that substantially af-
fected the export earnings of Trinidad and Tobago, the
Netherlands Antilles, and the Bahamas. But the goals of the
CBI began to be realized as non-traditional exports to the
United States increased by 150% from 1983 to 1991. By 1991,
total CBI exports to the United States had almost returned to
export levels existing before the fall in petroleum prices. 6
As a consequence of the CBI and the fall in petroleum
prices, the Caribbean Basin countries are dependent on ex-
ports of petroleum for only 20% of their total exports, while
they have increased exports of non-traditional products to
60% of total exports. CBI-related investments have helped to
significantly expand and diversify the economies of the Carib-
bean Basin countries, which now export such non-traditional
items as apparel, frozen shrimp and lobster, jewelry, medical
instruments, pineapple, melons, electronics, frozen vegetables,
and sports equipment. As a result of the development of new
industries and expanded production in the CBI countries, U.S.
exports to the region increased 68% to a total of $10.4 billion
in 1991.
A 1990 U.S. Department of Commerce study documented
789 new foreign direct investments in beneficiary countries
since the CBI was established in 1983. Those investments to-
talled $2.2 billion in new assets. They employ 142,000 full-
time workers and generate $1.3 billion annually in foreign ex-
change earnings.5 7 The increased economic activity in the re-
gion due to the CBI has demonstrated the value of the
initiative to the governments of the CBI beneficiary countries.
It is now clear that trade and investment liberalization, coupled
with local reforms that create a climate more conducive to
business has positive effects such as increased economic
growth, greater foreign exchange earnings, more jobs, and
55. 26 U.S.C. § 936 (1988).
56. See Alexander E. Braier, Market Is Growing; Has Good Long-Term Potential, Bus.
AMERICA, Apr. 22, 1991, at 11.
57. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 1990 CARIBBEAN BASIN INVESTMENT SURVEY
(1990); see also Braier, supra note 56, at 11.
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higher standards of living. These "demonstration effects" of
the CBI have persuaded most of the region's leaders that the
more ambitious, long-term goals of the Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative warrant their enthusiastic support.
VI. ANDEAN TRADE INITIATIVE
On December 4, 1991, the Andean Trade Preference Act
was signed into law by President Bush. 58 The so-called An-
dean Trade Initiative (ATI) builds on our experience with the
CBI and provides a similar program for the Andean countries
of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. The ATI fulfills the
commitment President Bush made at the Cartagena, Colom-
bia, drug summit in February 1990 to create alternative eco-
nomic opportunities to the production, processing, and
distribution of illegal drugs. In addition, the ATI is intended
to build on the momentum already evident in the region to-
ward trade and investment liberalization and domestic eco-
nomic reforms. Policy changes and reforms instituted as part
of the ATI will lay the foundation on which the Andean coun-
tries can build toward hemisphere-wide free trade under the
EAT.
The ATI, like the CBI, provides duty-free access to the U.S.
market for most Andean products, subject to country-specific
designation by the President once certain conditions are met.
59
The products excluded from the CBI also are excluded from
the ATI. However, the ATI also excludes some benefits which
are included in the CBI: guaranteed access levels for textiles
and apparel, section 936 export financing, and U.S. market ac-
cess for products assembled from 100% U.S. components.
Both Andean and U.S. exporters are expected to benefit
from the ATI. The Andean countries are expected to export
more cut flowers, cereals, wood products, spices, seafood, fruit
juices, tropical fruits, citrus, precious metals, and minerals to
the United States. The United States, in turn, will export more
goods related to agribusiness, commercial fishing, data
processing, telecommunications, biotechnology, and mining
industries.
58. Pub. L. No. 102-182, Title II, 105 Stat. 1236, 1237-39 (1991) (codified at 19
U.S.C.A. §§ 3201-3206 (West Supp. 1992)).
59. Id. at §§ 202-203.
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VII. MULTILATERALISM VERSUS REGIONALISM
Various observers have expressed concern that the United
States' goal to unite the Western Hemisphere into a single free
trade area represents a weakening of our commitment to the
multilateral trading system. Nothing could be further from the
truth. The United States remains firmly committed to the mul-
tilateral trading system and to the successful conclusion of the
ongoing Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.
Regional arrangements such as the European Community,
the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA),6 ° the Australia/
New Zealand Greater Cooperation Agreement, 61 the U.S.-Can-
ada Free Trade Agreement (CFTA)62 and, prospectively, the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),63 are per-
mitted under GATT article XXIV:6. 6 In essence, this article
allows like-minded GATT member countries to depart from
the most-favored-nation principle in order to achieve greater
and faster trade liberalization as long as the agreement covers
substantially all trade and does not impose new restrictions on
imports from non-member countries. The CFTA meets those
tests, as will NAFTA. Indeed, the CFTA and NAFTA result
from extending the free trade principles of GATT to their logi-
cal conclusions.
Moreover, for the United States, regionalism would be a
self-defeating strategy. Only 35% of U.S. external trade is
with countries of the Western Hemisphere. 65 Similarly, only
32% of Japan's exports go to Pacific Rim countries.66 Hence,
neither the United States nor Japan can afford to pursue lim-
ited regional trading policies.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This is an exciting time for trade in the Western Hemi-
sphere. The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement is a landmark
60. Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Ass'n, Jan. 4, 1960, 370
U.N.T.S. 3.
61. New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 31 1965, 554 U.N.T.S.
169.
62. CFTA, supra note 15.
63. See NAFTA Pact Can Be Reached by November, But Passage Is Up to Congress, 9 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 666 (Apr. 15, 1992).
64. GATT, supra note 6, 61 Stat. at A43-A48, 55 U.N.T.S. at 272.
65. See WORLD FACTBOOK 1991, supra note 28, at 325.
66. Id. at 160.
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achievement which is guiding the way for other countries to
pursue free trade and market-oriented policies and programs.
As one FTA takes root and its members prosper, the example
encourages others to follow.
The United States sees the changes taking place in Mexico as
a historic window of opportunity, one that economics, geogra-
phy, and history compel us to pursue. A North American Free
Trade Agreement offers an unparalleled opportunity to cap-
ture the energies of our three economies in order to propel us
into the vanguard of global competitiveness. Similarly, the En-
terprise for the Americas, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and
the Andean Trade Initiative reflect the continuing commit-
ment of the United States to economic growth through policies
which open markets and liberalize trade and investment.
With the help and support of the American people, particu-
larly the U.S. business community, we can realize the full eco-
nomic potential of trade and investment liberalization for the
benefit of this and future generations of our citizens.
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